Political Change and administrative turnover in meritocratic systems

Jostein Askim, Tobias Bach*, Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A change of government or minister constitutes a stress test for the relationship between ministers and bureaucrats. The new political masters may question the loyalty of incumbent bureaucrats and seek to replace them. However,
the relationship between political changes and administrative turnover is
poorly understood in meritocratic systems. This article analyses how changes
of either government or minister affect the turnover of permanent secretaries
in Denmark and Norway (1970–2020). Whereas ministers are completely reliant
on career bureaucrats in pure meritocratic systems, they are supported by
political appointees in hybrid meritocratic systems. The article investigates
whether the effect of political changes on administrative turnover is mediated
by the presence or absence of political appointees. Changes of government
increase the risk of administrative turnover in Norway (hybrid system), but
there are no such effects in Denmark (pure system), suggesting that political
appointees potentially undermine the permanence of career bureaucrats
Original languageEnglish
JournalWest European Politics
Volume47
Issue2
Pages (from-to)329-355
Number of pages27
ISSN0140-2382
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2024

Keywords

  • Administrative turnover
  • meritocracy
  • policy advice
  • political appointees
  • politicisation

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