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Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

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Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. / Overgaard, Morten.

In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol. 373, No. 1755, 20170353, 19.09.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Overgaard, M 2018, 'Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access', Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, vol. 373, no. 1755, 20170353. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0353

APA

Overgaard, M. (2018). Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 373(1755), [20170353]. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0353

CBE

Overgaard M. 2018. Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 373(1755). https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0353

MLA

Overgaard, Morten. "Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2018. 373(1755). https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0353

Vancouver

Overgaard M. Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2018 Sep 19;373(1755). 20170353. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0353

Author

Overgaard, Morten. / Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2018 ; Vol. 373, No. 1755.

Bibtex

@article{1e3dc2acc46046259e5f5fa1a52aee99,
title = "Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access",
abstract = "In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of Ned Block who suggests that phenomenal content overflows cognitive access. I will review the evidence and show that existing data, in fact, do not demonstrate overflow. I will further argue that overflow is theoretically possible -yet highly difficult to empirically demonstrate -under the condition that 'cognitive access' is defined as working memory or attention. However, if 'access' is defined as information becoming 'cognitively available', in a broader sense, I will argue that a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible. This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.",
keywords = "Access, Consciousness, Phenomenal consciousness, Subjective experience",
author = "Morten Overgaard",
year = "2018",
month = "9",
day = "19",
doi = "10.1098/rstb.2017.0353",
language = "English",
volume = "373",
journal = "Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences",
issn = "0962-8436",
publisher = "ROYAL SOC",
number = "1755",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

AU - Overgaard, Morten

PY - 2018/9/19

Y1 - 2018/9/19

N2 - In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of Ned Block who suggests that phenomenal content overflows cognitive access. I will review the evidence and show that existing data, in fact, do not demonstrate overflow. I will further argue that overflow is theoretically possible -yet highly difficult to empirically demonstrate -under the condition that 'cognitive access' is defined as working memory or attention. However, if 'access' is defined as information becoming 'cognitively available', in a broader sense, I will argue that a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible. This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

AB - In consciousness research, it is common to distinguish between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Recently, a number of scientists have attempted to show that phenomenal content can be empirically separated from cognitive access and, accordingly, that the mental content that is accessed is not (always) identical to the content that is experienced. One notable position is that of Ned Block who suggests that phenomenal content overflows cognitive access. I will review the evidence and show that existing data, in fact, do not demonstrate overflow. I will further argue that overflow is theoretically possible -yet highly difficult to empirically demonstrate -under the condition that 'cognitive access' is defined as working memory or attention. However, if 'access' is defined as information becoming 'cognitively available', in a broader sense, I will argue that a separation between subjective experience and access is impossible. This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

KW - Access

KW - Consciousness

KW - Phenomenal consciousness

KW - Subjective experience

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051535249&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1098/rstb.2017.0353

DO - 10.1098/rstb.2017.0353

M3 - Journal article

VL - 373

JO - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

JF - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

SN - 0962-8436

IS - 1755

M1 - 20170353

ER -