Department of Political Science

Party politics and the power to report: informational efficiency in bicameralism

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Party politics and the power to report: informational efficiency in bicameralism. / Finke, Daniel; Han, JeongHun.
In: Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1, 02.01.2014, p. 133-150.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Finke D, Han J. Party politics and the power to report: informational efficiency in bicameralism. Journal of European Public Policy. 2014 Jan 2;21(1):133-150. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2013.822823

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Finke, Daniel ; Han, JeongHun. / Party politics and the power to report : informational efficiency in bicameralism. In: Journal of European Public Policy. 2014 ; Vol. 21, No. 1. pp. 133-150.

Bibtex

@article{029434c39f924cedbdab637a6b038394,
title = "Party politics and the power to report: informational efficiency in bicameralism",
abstract = "The system of single rapporteurships was introduced at times when the European Parliament was trying hard to establish its powers vis-a-vis the Council of Ministers. Over the years, party politics has become increasingly important for European Union legislation. This historical development triggers the question to what extent the powers of the rapporteur depend on her partisan ties to the Council of Ministers. In order to answer this question we analyse legislative reports authored between 2004 and 2009. We argue that the rapporteur can successfully form coalitions inside the European Parliament. However, if the rapporteur's party is represented inside the Council of Ministers, she may be suspected of supporting national rather than partisan interests. Therefore, representation in the Council is a double-edged sword: rapporteurs whose parties are in government find it easier to gain information on the proceedings inside the Council, but they lose credibility with their partisan peers inside the European Parliament.",
keywords = "Bicameralism, European Parliament, Council of Ministers, legislative studies, EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT, UNION, RAPPORTEURS, ALLOCATION, COMMITTEES, QUESTIONS, OVERSIGHT",
author = "Daniel Finke and JeongHun Han",
year = "2014",
month = jan,
day = "2",
doi = "10.1080/13501763.2013.822823",
language = "English",
volume = "21",
pages = "133--150",
journal = "Journal of European Public Policy",
issn = "1350-1763",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Party politics and the power to report

T2 - informational efficiency in bicameralism

AU - Finke, Daniel

AU - Han, JeongHun

PY - 2014/1/2

Y1 - 2014/1/2

N2 - The system of single rapporteurships was introduced at times when the European Parliament was trying hard to establish its powers vis-a-vis the Council of Ministers. Over the years, party politics has become increasingly important for European Union legislation. This historical development triggers the question to what extent the powers of the rapporteur depend on her partisan ties to the Council of Ministers. In order to answer this question we analyse legislative reports authored between 2004 and 2009. We argue that the rapporteur can successfully form coalitions inside the European Parliament. However, if the rapporteur's party is represented inside the Council of Ministers, she may be suspected of supporting national rather than partisan interests. Therefore, representation in the Council is a double-edged sword: rapporteurs whose parties are in government find it easier to gain information on the proceedings inside the Council, but they lose credibility with their partisan peers inside the European Parliament.

AB - The system of single rapporteurships was introduced at times when the European Parliament was trying hard to establish its powers vis-a-vis the Council of Ministers. Over the years, party politics has become increasingly important for European Union legislation. This historical development triggers the question to what extent the powers of the rapporteur depend on her partisan ties to the Council of Ministers. In order to answer this question we analyse legislative reports authored between 2004 and 2009. We argue that the rapporteur can successfully form coalitions inside the European Parliament. However, if the rapporteur's party is represented inside the Council of Ministers, she may be suspected of supporting national rather than partisan interests. Therefore, representation in the Council is a double-edged sword: rapporteurs whose parties are in government find it easier to gain information on the proceedings inside the Council, but they lose credibility with their partisan peers inside the European Parliament.

KW - Bicameralism

KW - European Parliament

KW - Council of Ministers

KW - legislative studies

KW - EUROPEAN-PARLIAMENT

KW - UNION

KW - RAPPORTEURS

KW - ALLOCATION

KW - COMMITTEES

KW - QUESTIONS

KW - OVERSIGHT

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2013.822823

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2013.822823

M3 - Journal article

VL - 21

SP - 133

EP - 150

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

SN - 1350-1763

IS - 1

ER -