On the Social Cost of Distributed Selfish Content Replication

  • Gerasimos G. Pollatos
  • , Orestis A. Telelis
  • , Vassilis Zissimopoulos

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperConference articleResearchpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study distributed content replication networks formed voluntarily by selfish autonomous users, seeking access to information objects that originate form distant servers. Each user caters to minimization of its individual access cost by replicating locally (up to constrained storage capacity) a subset of objects, and accessing the rest form the nearest possible location. We show existence of stable networks by proving existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for a game-theoretic formulation of this situation. Social (overall) cost of stable networks is measured by the average or by the maximum access cost experienced by any user. We study socially most and least expensive stable networks by means of tight bounds on the ratios of the Price of Anarchy and Stability respectively. Although in the worst case the ratios may coincide, we identify cases where they differ significantly. We comment on simulations exhibiting occurrence of cost-efficient stable networks on average.
Original languageEnglish
Book seriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Pages (from-to)195-206
Number of pages12
ISSN0302-9743
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
EventNETWORKING 2008, Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, Wireless Networks, Next Generation Internet , 7th International IFIP-TC6 Networking Conference - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 5 May 20089 May 2008
Conference number: 7

Conference

ConferenceNETWORKING 2008, Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, Wireless Networks, Next Generation Internet , 7th International IFIP-TC6 Networking Conference
Number7
Country/TerritorySingapore
CitySingapore
Period05/05/200809/05/2008

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