Department of Economics and Business Economics

On the optimal composition of committees

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  • Ruth Ben-Yashar, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Unknown
  • Leif Danziger

This paper derives a simple characterization of how to optimally divide an organization’s experts into different decision-making committees. The focus is on many three-member committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. We find that the allocation of experts to committees is optimal if and only if it minimizes the sum of the products of the experts’ skills in each committee. As a result, given the experts of any two committees, the product of the experts’ skills should be as similar as possible in the two committees, and it is never optimal to have the three worst experts in one committee and the three best experts in another.

Original languageEnglish
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume43
Issue4
Pages (from-to)973-980
Number of pages8
ISSN0176-1714
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014

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