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On the Evolutionary Stability of 'Tough' Bargaining Behavior

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  • Anders Poulsen, Denmark
This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long as the Proposer does not directly observe the Responder's commitment to rejecting low offers.
Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Game Theory Review
Volume5
Issue1
Pages (from-to)63-73
Number of pages11
ISSN0219-1989
Publication statusPublished - 2003

    Research areas

  • Game theory, evolution, bargaining, efficiency, toughness

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