Department of Economics and Business Economics

On the equivalence of buyer and seller proposals within canonical matching and pricing environments

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    Final published version, 825 KB, PDF document

  • John Kennes
  • Daniel le Maire, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
This paper considers equilibrium proposals by either buyers or sellers in the canonical ‘urnball’ matching market. The proposals can either be posted prices announced by buyers; posted prices announced by sellers; or announcements by sellers (or by buyers) to entertain price proposals, as in auctions. We derive the expected revenue equivalence of these different modes of proposing in this canonical trading environment.
Original languageEnglish
Place of publicationAarhus
PublisherInstitut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet
Number of pages12
Publication statusPublished - 25 Oct 2016
SeriesEconomics Working Papers
Number2016-10

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