On the design of citizens' initiatives in a union of states

Nicola Maaser*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper studies the design of popular initiatives in unions of states. We analyze the effect of state-specific threshold requirements on the incentives of a rational campaign organizer who decides which constituencies to target. If the heterogeneity of preferences in a population increases with its size, degressively proportional thresholds satisfy the normative objective of 'neutrality' between individuals from different states. In contrast, thresholds which are linear in population size are 'neutral' if a priori no differences between states are acknowledged.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume120
Issue1
Pages (from-to)36-39
Number of pages4
ISSN0165-1765
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2013

Keywords

  • Direct democracy
  • Initiatives
  • Political campaigns

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