Department of Economics and Business Economics

Network centrality and delegated investment performance

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Network centrality and delegated investment performance. / Rossi, A.G.; Blake, D.; Timmermann, Allan; Tonks, I.; Wermers, R.

In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 128, No. 1, 2018, p. 183-206.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Rossi, AG, Blake, D, Timmermann, A, Tonks, I & Wermers, R 2018, 'Network centrality and delegated investment performance', Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 128, no. 1, pp. 183-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003

APA

Rossi, A. G., Blake, D., Timmermann, A., Tonks, I., & Wermers, R. (2018). Network centrality and delegated investment performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 128(1), 183-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003

CBE

Rossi AG, Blake D, Timmermann A, Tonks I, Wermers R. 2018. Network centrality and delegated investment performance. Journal of Financial Economics. 128(1):183-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003

MLA

Rossi, A.G. et al. "Network centrality and delegated investment performance". Journal of Financial Economics. 2018, 128(1). 183-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003

Vancouver

Rossi AG, Blake D, Timmermann A, Tonks I, Wermers R. Network centrality and delegated investment performance. Journal of Financial Economics. 2018;128(1):183-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003

Author

Rossi, A.G. ; Blake, D. ; Timmermann, Allan ; Tonks, I. ; Wermers, R. / Network centrality and delegated investment performance. In: Journal of Financial Economics. 2018 ; Vol. 128, No. 1. pp. 183-206.

Bibtex

@article{55aa860122fb47fda30cc95081fcab0a,
title = "Network centrality and delegated investment performance",
abstract = "We show a positive relation between network centrality and risk-adjusted performance in a delegated investment management setting. More connected managers take more portfolio risk and receive higher investor flows, consistent with these managers improving their ability to exploit investment opportunities through their network connections. Greater network connections are shown to be particularly important in reducing the diseconomies of scale for large managers who are well connected. We also use the exogenous merger of two investment consultants, which creates a sudden change in the network connections of the managers they oversee, to provide evidence that a greater number of connections translates into better portfolio performance.",
keywords = "Asset management, Flows, INVESTORS, Investment performance, MANAGEMENT, MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE, Manager skills, Networks, STOCK-MARKET",
author = "A.G. Rossi and D. Blake and Allan Timmermann and I. Tonks and R. Wermers",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003",
language = "English",
volume = "128",
pages = "183--206",
journal = "Journal of Financial Economics",
issn = "0304-405X",
publisher = "Elsevier BV",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Network centrality and delegated investment performance

AU - Rossi, A.G.

AU - Blake, D.

AU - Timmermann, Allan

AU - Tonks, I.

AU - Wermers, R.

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - We show a positive relation between network centrality and risk-adjusted performance in a delegated investment management setting. More connected managers take more portfolio risk and receive higher investor flows, consistent with these managers improving their ability to exploit investment opportunities through their network connections. Greater network connections are shown to be particularly important in reducing the diseconomies of scale for large managers who are well connected. We also use the exogenous merger of two investment consultants, which creates a sudden change in the network connections of the managers they oversee, to provide evidence that a greater number of connections translates into better portfolio performance.

AB - We show a positive relation between network centrality and risk-adjusted performance in a delegated investment management setting. More connected managers take more portfolio risk and receive higher investor flows, consistent with these managers improving their ability to exploit investment opportunities through their network connections. Greater network connections are shown to be particularly important in reducing the diseconomies of scale for large managers who are well connected. We also use the exogenous merger of two investment consultants, which creates a sudden change in the network connections of the managers they oversee, to provide evidence that a greater number of connections translates into better portfolio performance.

KW - Asset management

KW - Flows

KW - INVESTORS

KW - Investment performance

KW - MANAGEMENT

KW - MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE

KW - Manager skills

KW - Networks

KW - STOCK-MARKET

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85042882194&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003

DO - 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003

M3 - Journal article

VL - 128

SP - 183

EP - 206

JO - Journal of Financial Economics

JF - Journal of Financial Economics

SN - 0304-405X

IS - 1

ER -