Department of Economics and Business Economics

Network centrality and delegated investment performance

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  • A.G. Rossi
  • ,
  • D. Blake
  • ,
  • Allan Timmermann
  • I. Tonks, University of Bath School of Management
  • ,
  • R. Wermers, City University London

We show a positive relation between network centrality and risk-adjusted performance in a delegated investment management setting. More connected managers take more portfolio risk and receive higher investor flows, consistent with these managers improving their ability to exploit investment opportunities through their network connections. Greater network connections are shown to be particularly important in reducing the diseconomies of scale for large managers who are well connected. We also use the exogenous merger of two investment consultants, which creates a sudden change in the network connections of the managers they oversee, to provide evidence that a greater number of connections translates into better portfolio performance.

Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume128
Issue1
Pages (from-to)183-206
Number of pages24
ISSN0304-405X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

    Research areas

  • Asset management, Flows, INVESTORS, Investment performance, MANAGEMENT, MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE, Manager skills, Networks, STOCK-MARKET

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ID: 110035063