Department of Management

Multi-level state capitalism: Chinese state-owned buisness groups

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Multi-level state capitalism : Chinese state-owned buisness groups. / Arnoldi, Jakob; Villadsen, Anders Ryom; Chen, Xin; Na, Chaohong.

In: Management and Organization Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1740877618000360, 03.2019, p. 55-79.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Arnoldi, J, Villadsen, AR, Chen, X & Na, C 2019, 'Multi-level state capitalism: Chinese state-owned buisness groups', Management and Organization Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 1740877618000360, pp. 55-79. https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2018.36

APA

Arnoldi, J., Villadsen, A. R., Chen, X., & Na, C. (2019). Multi-level state capitalism: Chinese state-owned buisness groups. Management and Organization Review, 15(1), 55-79. [1740877618000360]. https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2018.36

CBE

MLA

Vancouver

Arnoldi J, Villadsen AR, Chen X, Na C. Multi-level state capitalism: Chinese state-owned buisness groups. Management and Organization Review. 2019 Mar;15(1):55-79. 1740877618000360. https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2018.36

Author

Arnoldi, Jakob ; Villadsen, Anders Ryom ; Chen, Xin ; Na, Chaohong. / Multi-level state capitalism : Chinese state-owned buisness groups. In: Management and Organization Review. 2019 ; Vol. 15, No. 1. pp. 55-79.

Bibtex

@article{b3bb5d88e53749ceb5e039c874e10b60,
title = "Multi-level state capitalism: Chinese state-owned buisness groups",
abstract = "We argue that vertical interlocks in Chinese state-owned business groups are important mechanisms for coordination and information exchange between the apex firm and affiliated firms, and that they are also mechanisms for government owners of the business groups to exercise control. By combining resource dependence theory with elements from transaction cost economics and agency theory, we propose that the need for interlocks increases the higher the level of government ownership. The central government is therefore more likely to use vertical interlocks than the provincial governments, which again are more likely to use vertical interlocks than the municipal governments. We develop three hypotheses based on these arguments. A regression analysis of a hand-collected data set finds strong support for our hypotheses. Our results shed light on coordination and governance issues within the state-owned sector in China and on an important means for mitigating these issues used by the government owners and firms affiliated with state-owned groups.",
keywords = "Business groups, China, Government, Interlocks",
author = "Jakob Arnoldi and Villadsen, {Anders Ryom} and Xin Chen and Chaohong Na",
year = "2019",
month = "3",
doi = "10.1017/mor.2018.36",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "55--79",
journal = "Management and Organization Review",
issn = "1740-8776",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Multi-level state capitalism

T2 - Chinese state-owned buisness groups

AU - Arnoldi, Jakob

AU - Villadsen, Anders Ryom

AU - Chen, Xin

AU - Na, Chaohong

PY - 2019/3

Y1 - 2019/3

N2 - We argue that vertical interlocks in Chinese state-owned business groups are important mechanisms for coordination and information exchange between the apex firm and affiliated firms, and that they are also mechanisms for government owners of the business groups to exercise control. By combining resource dependence theory with elements from transaction cost economics and agency theory, we propose that the need for interlocks increases the higher the level of government ownership. The central government is therefore more likely to use vertical interlocks than the provincial governments, which again are more likely to use vertical interlocks than the municipal governments. We develop three hypotheses based on these arguments. A regression analysis of a hand-collected data set finds strong support for our hypotheses. Our results shed light on coordination and governance issues within the state-owned sector in China and on an important means for mitigating these issues used by the government owners and firms affiliated with state-owned groups.

AB - We argue that vertical interlocks in Chinese state-owned business groups are important mechanisms for coordination and information exchange between the apex firm and affiliated firms, and that they are also mechanisms for government owners of the business groups to exercise control. By combining resource dependence theory with elements from transaction cost economics and agency theory, we propose that the need for interlocks increases the higher the level of government ownership. The central government is therefore more likely to use vertical interlocks than the provincial governments, which again are more likely to use vertical interlocks than the municipal governments. We develop three hypotheses based on these arguments. A regression analysis of a hand-collected data set finds strong support for our hypotheses. Our results shed light on coordination and governance issues within the state-owned sector in China and on an important means for mitigating these issues used by the government owners and firms affiliated with state-owned groups.

KW - Business groups

KW - China

KW - Government

KW - Interlocks

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85063982002&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/mor.2018.36

DO - 10.1017/mor.2018.36

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

SP - 55

EP - 79

JO - Management and Organization Review

JF - Management and Organization Review

SN - 1740-8776

IS - 1

M1 - 1740877618000360

ER -