TY - JOUR
T1 - Moralizing gods, impartiality and religious parochialism across 15 societies
AU - Lang, Martin
AU - Purzycki, Benjamin G.
AU - Apicella, Coren L.
AU - Atkinson, Quentin D.
AU - Bolyanatz, Alexander
AU - Cohen, Emma
AU - Handley, Carla
AU - Klocova, Eva Kundtova
AU - Lesorogol, Carolyn
AU - Mathew, Sarah
AU - McNamara, Rita A.
AU - Moya, Cristina
AU - Placek, Caitlyn D.
AU - Soler, Montserrat
AU - Vardy, Thomas
AU - Weigel, Jonathan L.
AU - Willard, Aiyana K.
AU - Xygalatas, Dimitris
AU - Norenzayan, Ara
AU - Henrich, Joseph
PY - 2019/3/6
Y1 - 2019/3/6
N2 - The emergence of large-scale cooperation during the Holocene remains a central problem in the evolutionary literature. One hypothesis points to culturally evolved beliefs in punishing, interventionist gods that facilitate the extension of cooperative behaviour toward geographically distant coreligionists. Furthermore, another hypothesis points to such mechanisms being constrained to the religious ingroup, possibly at the expense of religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we administered two behavioural experiments and a set of interviews to a sample of 2228 participants from 15 diverse populations. These populations included foragers, pastoralists, horticulturalists, and wage labourers, practicing Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, but also forms of animism and ancestor worship. Using the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG) in which individuals allocated money between themselves, local and geographically distant co-religionists, and religious outgroups, we found that higher ratings of gods as monitoring and punishing predicted decreased local favouritism (RAGs) and increased resource-sharing with distant co-religionists (DGs). The effects of punishing and monitoring gods on out-group allocations revealed between-site variability, suggesting that in the absence of intergroup hostility, moralizing gods may be implicated in cooperative behaviour toward outgroups. These results provide support for the hypothesis that beliefs in monitoring and punitive gods help expand the circle of sustainable social interaction, and open questions about the treatment of religious outgroups.
AB - The emergence of large-scale cooperation during the Holocene remains a central problem in the evolutionary literature. One hypothesis points to culturally evolved beliefs in punishing, interventionist gods that facilitate the extension of cooperative behaviour toward geographically distant coreligionists. Furthermore, another hypothesis points to such mechanisms being constrained to the religious ingroup, possibly at the expense of religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we administered two behavioural experiments and a set of interviews to a sample of 2228 participants from 15 diverse populations. These populations included foragers, pastoralists, horticulturalists, and wage labourers, practicing Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, but also forms of animism and ancestor worship. Using the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG) in which individuals allocated money between themselves, local and geographically distant co-religionists, and religious outgroups, we found that higher ratings of gods as monitoring and punishing predicted decreased local favouritism (RAGs) and increased resource-sharing with distant co-religionists (DGs). The effects of punishing and monitoring gods on out-group allocations revealed between-site variability, suggesting that in the absence of intergroup hostility, moralizing gods may be implicated in cooperative behaviour toward outgroups. These results provide support for the hypothesis that beliefs in monitoring and punitive gods help expand the circle of sustainable social interaction, and open questions about the treatment of religious outgroups.
KW - COEVOLUTION
KW - EVOLUTION
KW - SUPERNATURAL PUNISHMENT
KW - cultural evolution
KW - impartiality
KW - parochialism
KW - punishing gods
KW - religion
KW - supernatural punishment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85062638222&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1098/rspb.2019.0202
DO - 10.1098/rspb.2019.0202
M3 - Journal article
C2 - 30836871
SN - 0962-8452
VL - 286
JO - Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
JF - Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
IS - 1898
M1 - 20190202
ER -