Department of Economics and Business Economics

Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability

Research output: Working paper/Preprint Working paperResearch

Standard

Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability. / Anderberg, Dan; Bagger, Jesper; Bhaskar, V.; Wilson, Tanya.

Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2019.

Research output: Working paper/Preprint Working paperResearch

Harvard

Anderberg, D, Bagger, J, Bhaskar, V & Wilson, T 2019 'Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability' Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

APA

Anderberg, D., Bagger, J., Bhaskar, V., & Wilson, T. (2019). Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability. Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. Economics Working Papers No. 2019-03

CBE

Anderberg D, Bagger J, Bhaskar V, Wilson T. 2019. Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet.

MLA

Anderberg, Dan et al. Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. (Economics Working Papers; Journal number 2019-03). 2019., 56 p.

Vancouver

Anderberg D, Bagger J, Bhaskar V, Wilson T. Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. 2019 Mar 18.

Author

Anderberg, Dan ; Bagger, Jesper ; Bhaskar, V. ; Wilson, Tanya. / Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability. Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2019. (Economics Working Papers; No. 2019-03).

Bibtex

@techreport{da510d9a106445088a58f990663befb8,
title = "Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability",
abstract = "We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using the 1972 UK Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) legislation as a natural experiment that induced a sudden, large shift in the distribution of academic qualifications in affected cohorts, but plausibly had no impact on the distribution of ability. We show that a Choo and Siow (2006) model with sorting on cohort, qualifications, and latent ability is identified and estimable using the RoSLA-induced population shifts. We find that the RoSLA isolated low ability individuals in the marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal effects stemming from ability and qualification differences. Differences in marriage probabilities are almost entirely driven by ability.",
keywords = "Marriage, Qualifications, Assortative mating, Latent ability",
author = "Dan Anderberg and Jesper Bagger and V. Bhaskar and Tanya Wilson",
year = "2019",
month = mar,
day = "18",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers",
number = "2019-03",
publisher = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability

AU - Anderberg, Dan

AU - Bagger, Jesper

AU - Bhaskar, V.

AU - Wilson, Tanya

PY - 2019/3/18

Y1 - 2019/3/18

N2 - We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using the 1972 UK Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) legislation as a natural experiment that induced a sudden, large shift in the distribution of academic qualifications in affected cohorts, but plausibly had no impact on the distribution of ability. We show that a Choo and Siow (2006) model with sorting on cohort, qualifications, and latent ability is identified and estimable using the RoSLA-induced population shifts. We find that the RoSLA isolated low ability individuals in the marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal effects stemming from ability and qualification differences. Differences in marriage probabilities are almost entirely driven by ability.

AB - We study marital sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability in an equilibrium marriage market model using the 1972 UK Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) legislation as a natural experiment that induced a sudden, large shift in the distribution of academic qualifications in affected cohorts, but plausibly had no impact on the distribution of ability. We show that a Choo and Siow (2006) model with sorting on cohort, qualifications, and latent ability is identified and estimable using the RoSLA-induced population shifts. We find that the RoSLA isolated low ability individuals in the marriage market, and affected marital outcomes of individuals whose qualification attainment were unaffected. We also decompose the difference in marriage probabilities between unqualified individuals and those with basic qualifications into causal effects stemming from ability and qualification differences. Differences in marriage probabilities are almost entirely driven by ability.

KW - Marriage, Qualifications, Assortative mating, Latent ability

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers

BT - Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability

PB - Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet

CY - Aarhus

ER -