Department of Economics and Business Economics

Managing intrinsic motivation in a long-run relationship

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Ran Spiegler, Tel Aviv University, UCL, London School of Economics and Political Science

We study a repeated principal–agent interaction, in which the principal offers a ”spot” wage contract at every period, and the agent's outside option follows a Markov process with i.i.d shocks. If the agent rejects an offer, the two parties are permanently separated. At any period during the relationship, the agent is productive as long as his wage does not fall below a ”reference point” which is defined as his lagged-expected wage in that period. We characterize the game's unique Markov perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium path exhibits an aspect of wage rigidity. The agent's total discounted rent is equal to the maximal shock value.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume165
Pages (from-to)6-9
Number of pages4
ISSN0165-1765
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2018

    Research areas

  • Dynamic contracting, Intrinsic motivation, Principal–agent, Reference-dependence, Wage rigidity

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