Department of Economics and Business Economics

Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders. / Nagatsu, Michiru; Larsen, Karen; Karabegovic, Mia; Székely, Marcell; Mønster, Dan; Michael, John.

In: Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 1, 31.01.2018, p. 137-149.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Nagatsu, M, Larsen, K, Karabegovic, M, Székely, M, Mønster, D & Michael, J 2018, 'Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders', Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 137-149. <http://journal.sjdm.org/16/161219/jdm161219.pdf>

APA

Nagatsu, M., Larsen, K., Karabegovic, M., Székely, M., Mønster, D., & Michael, J. (2018). Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders. Judgment and Decision Making, 13(1), 137-149. http://journal.sjdm.org/16/161219/jdm161219.pdf

CBE

Nagatsu M, Larsen K, Karabegovic M, Székely M, Mønster D, Michael J. 2018. Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders. Judgment and Decision Making. 13(1):137-149.

MLA

Nagatsu, Michiru et al. "Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders". Judgment and Decision Making. 2018, 13(1). 137-149.

Vancouver

Nagatsu M, Larsen K, Karabegovic M, Székely M, Mønster D, Michael J. Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders. Judgment and Decision Making. 2018 Jan 31;13(1):137-149.

Author

Nagatsu, Michiru ; Larsen, Karen ; Karabegovic, Mia ; Székely, Marcell ; Mønster, Dan ; Michael, John. / Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders. In: Judgment and Decision Making. 2018 ; Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 137-149.

Bibtex

@article{c461727a3f91411ca63da12b95325803,
title = "Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders",
abstract = "The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other{\textquoteright}s contributions in the experiment{\textquoteright}s second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others{\textquoteright} expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.",
keywords = " group-cooperation heuristics, public goods, group composition, expectations, solution thinking",
author = "Michiru Nagatsu and Karen Larsen and Mia Karabegovic and Marcell Sz{\'e}kely and Dan M{\o}nster and John Michael",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "31",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "137--149",
journal = "Judgment and Decision Making",
issn = "1930-2975",
publisher = "Society for Judgment and Decision Making",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Making good cider out of bad apples – Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders

AU - Nagatsu, Michiru

AU - Larsen, Karen

AU - Karabegovic, Mia

AU - Székely, Marcell

AU - Mønster, Dan

AU - Michael, John

PY - 2018/1/31

Y1 - 2018/1/31

N2 - The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment’s second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.

AB - The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment’s second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.

KW - group-cooperation heuristics

KW - public goods

KW - group composition

KW - expectations

KW - solution thinking

UR - http://journal.sjdm.org/vol13.1.html

M3 - Journal article

VL - 13

SP - 137

EP - 149

JO - Judgment and Decision Making

JF - Judgment and Decision Making

SN - 1930-2975

IS - 1

ER -