Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?

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  • Pierre Laurent G Saint-Germier
We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.
Translated title of the contributionAre rational intuitions modal?
Original languageFrench
JournalPhilosophiques
Volume44
Issue1
Pages (from-to)49-71
Number of pages22
ISSN0316-2923
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

    Research areas

  • Intuition, Necessity, Two-dimensional semantics, A priori

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