Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?

TY - JOUR

T1 - Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?

AU - Saint-Germier, Pierre Laurent G

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.

AB - We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.

KW - Intuition

KW - Necessity

KW - Two-dimensional semantics

KW - A priori

U2 - 10.7202/1040327ar

DO - 10.7202/1040327ar

M3 - Tidsskriftartikel

SN - 0316-2923

VL - 44

SP - 49

EP - 71

JO - Philosophiques

JF - Philosophiques

IS - 1

ER -