Department of Political Science

Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism

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  • Thomas Koenig, Univ Mannheim, University of Mannheim, Denmark
  • Daniel Finke

How do political parties with different policy-making interests and veto power respond to international terrorismcan coalition parties and bicameral legislatures overcome their policy-making tensions and form a unified front for adopting counterterrorist measures? This study examines German counterterrorist legislation before and after the attacks of 9/11 by using a dictionary-based computerized text analysis. Our findings demonstrate that in times of low threat, the level of intra-coalition and bicameral conflict decreases the likelihood of counterterrorist legislation. However, in the event of a high external threat, this effect disappears despite the continuing divergence in partisan policy preferences. This suggests that a high external threat imposes inaction costs on political parties, which they attempt to avoid by adopting counterterrorist measures in the legislative arena.

Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
Pages (from-to)262-282
Number of pages21
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2015
Externally publishedYes

    Research areas

  • terrorism, legislative governance, coalition politics, bicameralism, HUMAN-RIGHTS, COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, DECISION-MAKING, FOREIGN-AID, CONSEQUENCES, ELECTIONS, US

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