Justifying the evidential use of linguistic intuitions

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Justifying the evidential use of linguistic intuitions. / Brøcker, Karen.

In: Synthese, 2020.

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@article{1e0d7f051076443482d4c7fe47dcdb35,
title = "Justifying the evidential use of linguistic intuitions",
abstract = "Linguistic intuitive judgements are the de facto data source of choice within generative linguistics. But why we are justified in relying on intuitive judgements as evidence for grammars? In the philosophy of linguistics, this question has been hotly debated. I argue that the three most prominent views of that debate all have their problems. Devitt{\textquoteright}s Modest Explanation accounts for the wrong kind of intuitive judgements. The Voice of Competence view and Rey{\textquoteright}s account both lack independent evidence. I introduce and defend a novel proposal that accounts for the evidential role of linguistic intuitive judgements and avoids these shortcomings. On this account, linguistic intuitive judgements are reports of the speaker{\textquoteright}s immediate experience of trying to comprehend the sentence. This experience is due to the speaker{\textquoteright}s linguistic competence, at least in part, and so the justification for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions ultimately comes from the speaker{\textquoteright}s competence. However, the account does not rely on any special input from the speaker{\textquoteright}s competence being available as the basis for linguistic intuitive judgements.",
keywords = "Acceptability judgements, Grammaticality judgements, Linguistic intuitions, Philosophy of linguistics, Voice of Competence",
author = "Karen Br{\o}cker",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1007/s11229-020-02563-w",
language = "English",
journal = "Synthese",
issn = "0039-7857",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Justifying the evidential use of linguistic intuitions

AU - Brøcker, Karen

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Linguistic intuitive judgements are the de facto data source of choice within generative linguistics. But why we are justified in relying on intuitive judgements as evidence for grammars? In the philosophy of linguistics, this question has been hotly debated. I argue that the three most prominent views of that debate all have their problems. Devitt’s Modest Explanation accounts for the wrong kind of intuitive judgements. The Voice of Competence view and Rey’s account both lack independent evidence. I introduce and defend a novel proposal that accounts for the evidential role of linguistic intuitive judgements and avoids these shortcomings. On this account, linguistic intuitive judgements are reports of the speaker’s immediate experience of trying to comprehend the sentence. This experience is due to the speaker’s linguistic competence, at least in part, and so the justification for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions ultimately comes from the speaker’s competence. However, the account does not rely on any special input from the speaker’s competence being available as the basis for linguistic intuitive judgements.

AB - Linguistic intuitive judgements are the de facto data source of choice within generative linguistics. But why we are justified in relying on intuitive judgements as evidence for grammars? In the philosophy of linguistics, this question has been hotly debated. I argue that the three most prominent views of that debate all have their problems. Devitt’s Modest Explanation accounts for the wrong kind of intuitive judgements. The Voice of Competence view and Rey’s account both lack independent evidence. I introduce and defend a novel proposal that accounts for the evidential role of linguistic intuitive judgements and avoids these shortcomings. On this account, linguistic intuitive judgements are reports of the speaker’s immediate experience of trying to comprehend the sentence. This experience is due to the speaker’s linguistic competence, at least in part, and so the justification for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions ultimately comes from the speaker’s competence. However, the account does not rely on any special input from the speaker’s competence being available as the basis for linguistic intuitive judgements.

KW - Acceptability judgements

KW - Grammaticality judgements

KW - Linguistic intuitions

KW - Philosophy of linguistics

KW - Voice of Competence

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85079484116&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-020-02563-w

DO - 10.1007/s11229-020-02563-w

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85079484116

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

ER -