Abstract
Volunteer-based open-source production has become a significant new model for the organization of software development. Economics often pictures this phenomenon as a case of signalling: individuals engage in the volunteer programming of open-source software (OSS) as a labour-market signal resulting in a wage premium. Yet, this explanation could so far not be empirically tested. This article fills this gap by estimating an upper-bound composite wage premium of voluntary OSS contributions and by separating the potential signalling effect of OSS engagement from other effects. Although some 70% of OSS contributors believe that OSS involvement benefits their careers, we find no actual labour-market premium for OSS engagement. The presence of other motives, such as fun of play or altruism, renders OSS contributions too noisy to function as a signal.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Applied Economics |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 14 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1379-1394 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| ISSN | 0003-6846 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- Signalling
- open-source software
- voluntary work
- peer production
- wage formation
- OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARE
- OPEN-SOURCE PROJECTS
- STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
- MOTIVATIONS
- DEVELOPERS
- PARTICIPATION
- COMMUNITIES
- FORMS
- INNOVATION
- RETURNS