Is there a wage premium for volunteer OSS engagement? - signalling, learning and noise

Juergen Bitzer, Ingo Geishecker, Philipp J. H. Schroeder*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
190 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Volunteer-based open-source production has become a significant new model for the organization of software development. Economics often pictures this phenomenon as a case of signalling: individuals engage in the volunteer programming of open-source software (OSS) as a labour-market signal resulting in a wage premium. Yet, this explanation could so far not be empirically tested. This article fills this gap by estimating an upper-bound composite wage premium of voluntary OSS contributions and by separating the potential signalling effect of OSS engagement from other effects. Although some 70% of OSS contributors believe that OSS involvement benefits their careers, we find no actual labour-market premium for OSS engagement. The presence of other motives, such as fun of play or altruism, renders OSS contributions too noisy to function as a signal.

Original languageEnglish
JournalApplied Economics
Volume49
Issue14
Pages (from-to)1379-1394
Number of pages16
ISSN0003-6846
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • Signalling
  • open-source software
  • voluntary work
  • peer production
  • wage formation
  • OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARE
  • OPEN-SOURCE PROJECTS
  • STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
  • MOTIVATIONS
  • DEVELOPERS
  • PARTICIPATION
  • COMMUNITIES
  • FORMS
  • INNOVATION
  • RETURNS

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