Abstract
Many philosophers have thought that our folk, or pre-reflective, view of persistence is one on which objects endure. This assumption not only plays a role in disputes about the nature of persistence itself, but is also put to use in several other areas of metaphysics, including debates about the nature of change and temporal passage. In this paper, we empirically test three broad claims. First, that most people (i.e. most non-philosophers) believe that, and it seems to them as though, objects persist by enduring rather than perduring. Second, that most people have a view of change on which enduring but not perduring objects count as changing. Third, that one reason why the folk represent time as dynamical is because it seems to them, and they believe that, they endure through time. We found no evidence to support these claims. While there are certainly plenty of ‘folk’ endurantists in the population we tested, there are also plenty of ‘folk’ perdurantists. We did not find robust evidence that a majority of people believed that, or it seemed to them as though, objects endure rather than perdure. We conclude that many arguments in favour of endurantism that appeal to folk beliefs about, or experiences of, persisting objects and change rest on views about those beliefs and experiences that are empirically unsupported. There is no evidence to suggest that endurantism is the folk friendly view of persistence, and so we should stop treating it as such without argument.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 181 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages (from-to) | 2605-2638 |
| Number of pages | 34 |
| ISSN | 0031-8116 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2024 |
Keywords
- Change
- Endurance
- Experimental Philosophy
- Folk theory
- Perdurance
- Persistence
- Temporal passage
- Temporal phenomenology