Intrinsic Motivation versus Signaling in Open Source Software Development

TY - UNPB

T1 - Intrinsic Motivation versus Signaling in Open Source Software Development

AU - Bitzer, J

AU - Schrettl, W

AU - Schröder, P

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - This papers sheds light on the puzzling fact that even though open source software (OSS) is a public good, it is developed for free by highly qualified, young, motivated individuals, and evolves at a rapid pace. We show that when OSS development is understood as the private provision of a public good, these features emerge quite naturally. We adapt a dynamic private-provision-of-public-goods model to reflect key aspects of the OSS phenomenon. Apart from extrinsic motives (namely signaling), the present model also contains intrinsic motives of OSS programmers, such as play value or homo ludens payoff, userprogrammers' and gift culture benefits. Such intrinsic motives feature extensively in the wider OSS literature and contribute new insights to the economic analysis.

AB - This papers sheds light on the puzzling fact that even though open source software (OSS) is a public good, it is developed for free by highly qualified, young, motivated individuals, and evolves at a rapid pace. We show that when OSS development is understood as the private provision of a public good, these features emerge quite naturally. We adapt a dynamic private-provision-of-public-goods model to reflect key aspects of the OSS phenomenon. Apart from extrinsic motives (namely signaling), the present model also contains intrinsic motives of OSS programmers, such as play value or homo ludens payoff, userprogrammers' and gift culture benefits. Such intrinsic motives feature extensively in the wider OSS literature and contribute new insights to the economic analysis.

KW - Open Source software

KW - Public goods

KW - Homo ludens

KW - War of attrition

M3 - Working paper

BT - Intrinsic Motivation versus Signaling in Open Source Software Development

PB - Aarhus School of Business

CY - Aarhus

ER -