Abstract
Shech (2022) offers a critical assessment of my defense of anti-realism, developed in Resisting Scientific Realism. Induction and inductive inferences play a central role in Shech’s critical analysis of my defense of realism. I argue that Shech’s criticisms that relate to induction and inductive inference are problematic, and do not constitute a threat to my defense of anti-realism. Contrary to what Shech claims, the anti-realist does not need to explain why inductive inferences are successful. That is not part of contemporary realism/anti-realism debate. Further, such a demand fails to recognize that some anti-realists do not put much stock in induction.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| ISSN | 0269-8595 |
| DOIs |
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| Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Keywords
- anti-realism;
- inductive inferences;
- scientific rationality;
- Darwinian/selectionist explanation;
- the success of science