Indirect Revelation Mechanisms for Cake Cutting

Research output: Contribution to conferenceConference abstract for conferenceResearch

We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. In contrast, we exhibit randomized protocols that are truthful in expectation and compute approximately fair allocations.
Original languageEnglish
Publication year14 Mar 2014
Number of pages7
Publication statusPublished - 14 Mar 2014
EventEconomics and Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Social Choice - Warsaw, Poland
Duration: 14 Mar 201414 Mar 2014

Conference

ConferenceEconomics and Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Social Choice
CountryPoland
CityWarsaw
Period14/03/201414/03/2014

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