Inconsistent Retirement Timing

Christoph Merkle*, Philipp Schreiber, Martin Weber

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the effect of inconsistent time preferences on actual and planned retirement timing decisions in two independent datasets. Theory predicts that hyperbolic time preferences can lead to dynamically inconsistent retirement timing. In an online experiment with more than 2,000 participants, we find that time-inconsistent participants retire on average 1.75 years earlier than time-consistent participants do. The planned retirement age of non-retired participants decreases with age. This negative age effect is about twice as strong among time-inconsistent participants. The temptation of early retirement seems to rise in the final years of approaching retirement. Consequently, time-inconsistent participants have a higher probability of regretting their retirement decision. We find similar results for a representative household survey (German SAVE panel). Using smoking behavior and overdraft usage as time preference proxies, we confirm that timeinconsistent participants retire earlier and that non-retirees reduce their planned retirement age within the panel.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Human Resources
Volume59
Issue3
Pages (from-to)929-974
Number of pages46
ISSN0022-166X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2024

Keywords

  • Hyperbolic discounting
  • Retirement
  • Retirement age
  • Social security
  • Time preference
  • J18
  • D14
  • D15
  • H55
  • J22
  • D91
  • J26

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