How Bad is Selfish Voting?

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review



  • Simina Branzei
  • Ioannis Caragiannis, University of Patras, Greece
  • Jamie Morgenstern, Carnegie Mellon University, United States
  • Ariel Procaccia, Carnegie Mellon University, United States
It is well known that strategic behavior in elections is essentially unavoidable; we therefore ask: how bad can the rational outcome be? We answer this question via the notion of the price of anarchy, using the scores of alternatives as a proxy for their quality and bounding the ratio between the score of the optimal alternative and the score of the winning alternative in Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we are interested in Nash equilibria that are obtained via sequences of rational strategic moves. Focusing on three common voting rules — plurality, veto, and Borda — we provide very positive results for plurality and very negative results for Borda, and place veto in the middle of this spectrum.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Number of pages7
PublisherAAAI Press
Publication year14 Jul 2013
ISBN (print) 978-1-57735-615-8
Publication statusPublished - 14 Jul 2013
EventTwenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Bellevue, United States
Duration: 14 Jul 201318 Jul 2013


ConferenceTwenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
LandUnited States

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