Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

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It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

Translated title of the contributionHøjereordens viden og sensitivitet
Original languageEnglish
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Pages (from-to)339-349
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2020

    Research areas

  • Higher-order knowledge, belief-forming methods, sensitivity theory, transmission principle for knowledge

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