Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

TY - JOUR

T1 - Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

AU - Bjerring, Jens Christian Krarup

AU - Gundersen, Lars Bo

PY - 2020/4

Y1 - 2020/4

N2 - It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

AB - It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

KW - Higher-order knowledge

KW - belief-forming methods

KW - sensitivity theory

KW - transmission principle for knowledge

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85098139144&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/can.2019.36

DO - 10.1017/can.2019.36

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0045-5091

VL - 50

SP - 339

EP - 349

JO - Canadian Journal of Philosophy

JF - Canadian Journal of Philosophy

IS - 3

ER -