Department of Economics and Business Economics

Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition: Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition : Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition. / Jørgensen, Jan Guldager; Schröder, Philipp.

University of Southern Denmark : Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark, 2014.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Jørgensen, JG & Schröder, P 2014 'Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition: Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition' Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark, University of Southern Denmark.

APA

Jørgensen, J. G., & Schröder, P. (2014). Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition: Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition. University of Southern Denmark: Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark.

CBE

Jørgensen JG, Schröder P. 2014. Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition: Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition. University of Southern Denmark: Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark.

MLA

Jørgensen, Jan Guldager and Philipp Schröder Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition: Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition. University of Southern Denmark: Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark. 2014., 19 p.

Vancouver

Jørgensen JG, Schröder P. Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition: Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition. University of Southern Denmark: Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark. 2014.

Author

Jørgensen, Jan Guldager ; Schröder, Philipp. / Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition : Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition. University of Southern Denmark : Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark, 2014.

Bibtex

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title = "Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition: Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition",
abstract = "The present paper examines trade liberalization driven by the coordinationof product standards. For oligopolistic firms situated in separate markets that are initially sheltered by national standards, mutual recognition of standards implies entry and reduced profits at home paired with the opportunity to start export sales. In contrast, harmonization, in particular the prospect that one’s own national (but not the foreign) standard becomes the only globally acceptedstandard, opens the foreign market without balancing entry at home. We study these scenarios in a reduced form lobby game with two countries and three firms, where firms first lobby for the policy coordination regime (harmonization versus mutual recognition), and subsequently, in case of harmonization, the global standard is auctioned among the firms. We discuss welfare effects and conclude with policy implications. In particular, harmonized standards mayfail to harvest the full pro-competitive effects from trade liberalization compared to mutual recognition; moreover, the issue is most pronounced in markets featuring price competition.",
keywords = "Standard regimes, Harmonization, Technical trade barrieres, NTBs, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition",
author = "J{\o}rgensen, {Jan Guldager} and Philipp Schr{\"o}der",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition

T2 - Some pitfalls for the coordination of product standards under imperfect competition

AU - Jørgensen, Jan Guldager

AU - Schröder, Philipp

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - The present paper examines trade liberalization driven by the coordinationof product standards. For oligopolistic firms situated in separate markets that are initially sheltered by national standards, mutual recognition of standards implies entry and reduced profits at home paired with the opportunity to start export sales. In contrast, harmonization, in particular the prospect that one’s own national (but not the foreign) standard becomes the only globally acceptedstandard, opens the foreign market without balancing entry at home. We study these scenarios in a reduced form lobby game with two countries and three firms, where firms first lobby for the policy coordination regime (harmonization versus mutual recognition), and subsequently, in case of harmonization, the global standard is auctioned among the firms. We discuss welfare effects and conclude with policy implications. In particular, harmonized standards mayfail to harvest the full pro-competitive effects from trade liberalization compared to mutual recognition; moreover, the issue is most pronounced in markets featuring price competition.

AB - The present paper examines trade liberalization driven by the coordinationof product standards. For oligopolistic firms situated in separate markets that are initially sheltered by national standards, mutual recognition of standards implies entry and reduced profits at home paired with the opportunity to start export sales. In contrast, harmonization, in particular the prospect that one’s own national (but not the foreign) standard becomes the only globally acceptedstandard, opens the foreign market without balancing entry at home. We study these scenarios in a reduced form lobby game with two countries and three firms, where firms first lobby for the policy coordination regime (harmonization versus mutual recognition), and subsequently, in case of harmonization, the global standard is auctioned among the firms. We discuss welfare effects and conclude with policy implications. In particular, harmonized standards mayfail to harvest the full pro-competitive effects from trade liberalization compared to mutual recognition; moreover, the issue is most pronounced in markets featuring price competition.

KW - Standard regimes

KW - Harmonization

KW - Technical trade barrieres

KW - NTBs

KW - Cournot competition

KW - Bertrand competition

M3 - Working paper

BT - Harmonization versus Mutual Recognition

PB - Department of Business and Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark

CY - University of Southern Denmark

ER -