Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining

Nicola Maaser; Fabian Paetzel; Stefan Traub

doi:10.3390/g13010011

Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining

Nicola Maaser^*, Fabian Paetzel, Stefan Traub

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics and Business Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.

Original language	English
Article number	11
Journal	Games
Volume	13
Issue	1
Number of pages	25
ISSN	2073-4336
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010011
Publication status	Published - Jan 2022

Keywords

Bargaining
Gender differences
Laboratory experiment

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10.3390/g13010011Licence: CC BY

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title = "Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining",

abstract = "In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.",

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AU - Paetzel, Fabian

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N2 - In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.

AB - In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.

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KW - Gender differences

KW - Laboratory experiment

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ER -

Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining

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