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Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence

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Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence. / Eriksson, Tor Viking; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire.

In: Labour Economics, Vol. 16, No. 6, 2009, p. 679-688.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Eriksson, TV, Poulsen, A & Villeval, MC 2009, 'Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence', Labour Economics, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 679-688. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2009.08.006

APA

Eriksson, T. V., Poulsen, A., & Villeval, M. C. (2009). Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence. Labour Economics, 16(6), 679-688. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2009.08.006

CBE

MLA

Eriksson, Tor Viking, Anders Poulsen and Marie Claire Villeval. "Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence". Labour Economics. 2009, 16(6). 679-688. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2009.08.006

Vancouver

Author

Eriksson, Tor Viking ; Poulsen, Anders ; Villeval, Marie Claire. / Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence. In: Labour Economics. 2009 ; Vol. 16, No. 6. pp. 679-688.

Bibtex

@article{ca2d2f20037511df8a20000ea68e967b,
title = "Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence",
abstract = "This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay schemes and relative performance feedback policies on employee effort. We explore three feedback rules: no feedback on relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. We use two pay schemes, a piece rate and a tournament. We find that overall feedback does not improve performance. In contrast to the piece-rate pay scheme there is some evidence of positive peer effects in tournaments since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and front runners do not slack off. But in both pay schemes relative performance feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work; we refer to this as a {"}negative quality peer effect{"}.",
author = "Eriksson, {Tor Viking} and Anders Poulsen and Villeval, {Marie Claire}",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1016/j.labeco.2009.08.006",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "679--688",
journal = "Labour Economics",
issn = "0927-5371",
publisher = "Elsevier BV * North-Holland",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Feedback and Incentives

T2 - Experimental Evidence

AU - Eriksson, Tor Viking

AU - Poulsen, Anders

AU - Villeval, Marie Claire

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay schemes and relative performance feedback policies on employee effort. We explore three feedback rules: no feedback on relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. We use two pay schemes, a piece rate and a tournament. We find that overall feedback does not improve performance. In contrast to the piece-rate pay scheme there is some evidence of positive peer effects in tournaments since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and front runners do not slack off. But in both pay schemes relative performance feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work; we refer to this as a "negative quality peer effect".

AB - This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay schemes and relative performance feedback policies on employee effort. We explore three feedback rules: no feedback on relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated feedback. We use two pay schemes, a piece rate and a tournament. We find that overall feedback does not improve performance. In contrast to the piece-rate pay scheme there is some evidence of positive peer effects in tournaments since the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and front runners do not slack off. But in both pay schemes relative performance feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work; we refer to this as a "negative quality peer effect".

U2 - 10.1016/j.labeco.2009.08.006

DO - 10.1016/j.labeco.2009.08.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 16

SP - 679

EP - 688

JO - Labour Economics

JF - Labour Economics

SN - 0927-5371

IS - 6

ER -