Department of Political Science

You are here: » Explaining the judicial independence of international cou...

Explaining the judicial independence of international courts: a comparative analysis.

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › Research

  • Department of Political Science
What factors allow some international courts (ICs) to rule against the express preferences of powerful member states, whereas others routinely defer to governments? While judicial independence is not the only factor explaining the strength of a given international institution, it is a necessary condition. The paper first develops three sets of competing explanatory variables that potentially can explain variations in the judicial independence of ICs. The causal effects of these explanatory variables upon variance in judicial independence are investigated in a comparative analysis of the ACJ, ECJ, ECtHR and IACHR. It is found that the threat of governmental noncompliance and the strength of the constituency possessed by an IC have the most explanatory power, although there is still a significant residual that can only be explained by looking at factors relating to judicial choices and agency.
Original languageEnglish
Publication year2008
Number of pages47
Publication statusPublished - 2008
EventInternational Studies Association - San Francisco, United States
Duration: 26 Mar 2008 → 29 Mar 2008

Conference

ConferenceInternational Studies Association
CountryUnited States
CitySan Francisco
Period26/03/2008 → 29/03/2008

See relations at Aarhus University Citationformats

ID: 12394950