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Existence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

  • Guillaume Escamocher, Ecole Normale Supèrieure de Cachan, Paris, France
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
  • Rocio Santillan, Denmark
  • Department of Computer Science
We consider existence and computation of symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in single-item, sealed-bid, first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids. For the most general case, we show that existence of PSNE is NP-hard. Then, we present algorithmic results for the case of independent valuations and two ways of breaking ties: Vickrey tie-breaking and random tie-breaking.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'09) : SESSION: Interactions
EditorsKeith S. Decker, Jaime Simão Sichman, Carles Sierra, Cristiano Castelfranchi
Number of pages2
Volume2
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Publication year2009
Pages1227-1228
ISBN (print)978-0-9817381-7-8
Publication statusPublished - 2009
EventInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagents Systems (AAMAS'09) - Budapest, Hungary
Duration: 10 May 200915 May 2009
Conference number: 8

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagents Systems (AAMAS'09)
Nummer8
LandHungary
ByBudapest
Periode10/05/200915/05/2009

    Research areas

  • AAMAS proceedings, economics, interaction::auctions and related structures, theoretical

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