Exemplarity, Expressivity, Education

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This paper proposes that Cathrine Elgin’s and Nelson Goodman’s work on exemplification is relevant for discussions within moral philosophy and moral education. Generalizing Elgin’s and Goodman’s account of exemplification to also cover ethics the paper develop a two-factor account of moral exemplarity. According to this account instantiation and expressivity are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for someone or something to function as a moral exemplar. Applying this two-factor account of exemplarity to discussions within the philosophy of moral education the paper then argues that it is the expressive aspect of moral exemplars, which explains and justifies their educational significance. The paper concludes by discussing the similarities and differences between the expressivity account and the transparency criterion formulated by Michael Croce and Maria Vaccarezza in a recent paper.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Moral Education
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2019

    Research areas

  • exemplarity, expressivity, moral education, moral excellence, moral exemplars

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