Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in EU Treaty Negotiations. / Finke, Daniel.
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4, 10.2009, p. 543-569.Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in EU Treaty Negotiations
AU - Finke, Daniel
PY - 2009/10
Y1 - 2009/10
N2 - This article derives theoretical expectations about the importance of nonseparable preferences at EU treaty negotiations. It argues that member states' positions on the degree of integration depend on the expected reform of the decision rule and vice versa. This nonseparability effect varies across member states. Wealthier member states (net payers) would prefer a more majoritarian and efficient decision rule when confronted with a higher level of vertical integration. The overall size of the nonseparability effect can be explained by the policy area-specific degree of preference asymmetry. In order to test these expectations the article advances existing statistical models of ideal point estimation and derives a model that allows for an explicit estimation of nonseparability effects. It applies this model to data on member states' positions at the IGC 2003-4. The two-stage estimator presented in this article may be considered useful in other applications of ideal point estimators.
AB - This article derives theoretical expectations about the importance of nonseparable preferences at EU treaty negotiations. It argues that member states' positions on the degree of integration depend on the expected reform of the decision rule and vice versa. This nonseparability effect varies across member states. Wealthier member states (net payers) would prefer a more majoritarian and efficient decision rule when confronted with a higher level of vertical integration. The overall size of the nonseparability effect can be explained by the policy area-specific degree of preference asymmetry. In order to test these expectations the article advances existing statistical models of ideal point estimation and derives a model that allows for an explicit estimation of nonseparability effects. It applies this model to data on member states' positions at the IGC 2003-4. The two-stage estimator presented in this article may be considered useful in other applications of ideal point estimators.
KW - constitutional theory
KW - European integration
KW - nonseparability
KW - ANALYZING ROLL CALLS
KW - EUROPEAN-UNION
KW - DECISION-MAKING
KW - ALIGNMENTS
KW - POLITICS
U2 - 10.1177/0951629809339803
DO - 10.1177/0951629809339803
M3 - Journal article
VL - 21
SP - 543
EP - 569
JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics
JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics
SN - 0951-6298
IS - 4
ER -