Equivalence of canonical matching models

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Equivalence of canonical matching models. / Kennes, John; le Maire, Daniel; Roelsgaard, Sebastian T.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 124, 11.2020, p. 169-182.

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Kennes, J, le Maire, D & Roelsgaard, ST 2020, 'Equivalence of canonical matching models', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 124, pp. 169-182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.002

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Kennes, John ; le Maire, Daniel ; Roelsgaard, Sebastian T. / Equivalence of canonical matching models. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2020 ; Vol. 124. pp. 169-182.

Bibtex

@article{cff0a1245b7c417491ce83470ef61548,
title = "Equivalence of canonical matching models",
abstract = "This paper offers expected revenue and pricing equivalence results for canonical matching models. The equivalence of these models is centered on the assumption that there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, and the contact decisions of buyers to sellers are made independently. Therefore, the distribution of buyers to sellers is approximated by the Poisson distribution. The list of canonical matching models includes the models developed by Burdett and Judd (1983), Shimer (2005), and McAfee (1993). In the Burdett and Judd model, buyers post prices and the equilibrium features price dispersion because identical buyers play mixed strategies. In the Shimer model, sellers post a vector of prices corresponding to different buyer types. In equilibrium, all identical buyers pay the same price. In the McAfee model, equilibrium pricing is determined by simple second price auctions. McAfee's model also features price dispersion because the number of bidders at each auction is stochastic.",
keywords = "Competing auctions, Directed search, Poisson distribution, Price dispersion",
author = "John Kennes and {le Maire}, Daniel and Roelsgaard, {Sebastian T.}",
year = "2020",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.002",
language = "English",
volume = "124",
pages = "169--182",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Equivalence of canonical matching models

AU - Kennes, John

AU - le Maire, Daniel

AU - Roelsgaard, Sebastian T.

PY - 2020/11

Y1 - 2020/11

N2 - This paper offers expected revenue and pricing equivalence results for canonical matching models. The equivalence of these models is centered on the assumption that there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, and the contact decisions of buyers to sellers are made independently. Therefore, the distribution of buyers to sellers is approximated by the Poisson distribution. The list of canonical matching models includes the models developed by Burdett and Judd (1983), Shimer (2005), and McAfee (1993). In the Burdett and Judd model, buyers post prices and the equilibrium features price dispersion because identical buyers play mixed strategies. In the Shimer model, sellers post a vector of prices corresponding to different buyer types. In equilibrium, all identical buyers pay the same price. In the McAfee model, equilibrium pricing is determined by simple second price auctions. McAfee's model also features price dispersion because the number of bidders at each auction is stochastic.

AB - This paper offers expected revenue and pricing equivalence results for canonical matching models. The equivalence of these models is centered on the assumption that there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, and the contact decisions of buyers to sellers are made independently. Therefore, the distribution of buyers to sellers is approximated by the Poisson distribution. The list of canonical matching models includes the models developed by Burdett and Judd (1983), Shimer (2005), and McAfee (1993). In the Burdett and Judd model, buyers post prices and the equilibrium features price dispersion because identical buyers play mixed strategies. In the Shimer model, sellers post a vector of prices corresponding to different buyer types. In equilibrium, all identical buyers pay the same price. In the McAfee model, equilibrium pricing is determined by simple second price auctions. McAfee's model also features price dispersion because the number of bidders at each auction is stochastic.

KW - Competing auctions

KW - Directed search

KW - Poisson distribution

KW - Price dispersion

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089850158&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.002

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.002

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85089850158

VL - 124

SP - 169

EP - 182

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -