Abstract
The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimensional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial constituency configurations, the EU and the US are investigated by Monte-Carlo simulations. Penrose's square root rule, which originally applies to preference-free dichotomous decision environments and holds only under very specific conditions, comes close to ensuring equal representation. It is thus more robust than previously suggested.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 401-420 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| ISSN | 0176-1714 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2007 |