Abstract
This article supports calls for an increased integration of patients into taxonomic decision making in psychiatry by arguing that their exclusion constitutes a special kind of epistemic injustice: preemptive testimonial injustice, which precludes the opportunity for testimony due to a wrongly presumed irrelevance or lack of expertise. Here, this presumption is misguided for two reasons: (1) the role of values in psychiatric classification and (2) the potential function of first-person knowledge as a corrective means against implicitly value-laden, inaccurate, or incomplete diagnostic criteria sets. This kind of epistemic injustice leads to preventable epistemic losses in psychiatric classification, diagnosis, and treatment.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 86 |
Issue | 5 |
Pages (from-to) | 1064-1074 |
Number of pages | 11 |
ISSN | 0031-8248 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- DSM
- PHENOMENOLOGY
- DIAGNOSIS