Epistemic Injustice and Psychiatric Classification

Anke Bueter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

54 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article supports calls for an increased integration of patients into taxonomic decision making in psychiatry by arguing that their exclusion constitutes a special kind of epistemic injustice: preemptive testimonial injustice, which precludes the opportunity for testimony due to a wrongly presumed irrelevance or lack of expertise. Here, this presumption is misguided for two reasons: (1) the role of values in psychiatric classification and (2) the potential function of first-person knowledge as a corrective means against implicitly value-laden, inaccurate, or incomplete diagnostic criteria sets. This kind of epistemic injustice leads to preventable epistemic losses in psychiatric classification, diagnosis, and treatment.

Original languageEnglish
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume86
Issue5
Pages (from-to)1064-1074
Number of pages11
ISSN0031-8248
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2019
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • DSM
  • PHENOMENOLOGY
  • DIAGNOSIS

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