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Emergencies: On the Misuse of Government Powers

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Emergencies: On the Misuse of Government Powers. / Bjørnskov, Christian; Voigt, Stefan.
In: Public Choice, Vol. 190, No. 1-2, 01.2022, p. 1-32.

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Bjørnskov C, Voigt S. Emergencies: On the Misuse of Government Powers. Public Choice. 2022 Jan;190(1-2):1-32. doi: 10.1007/s11127-021-00918-6

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Bjørnskov, Christian ; Voigt, Stefan. / Emergencies: On the Misuse of Government Powers. In: Public Choice. 2022 ; Vol. 190, No. 1-2. pp. 1-32.

Bibtex

@article{d05a7090fd304472ba9ee8c373cd51a8,
title = "Emergencies:: On the Misuse of Government Powers",
abstract = "Nine out of 10 constitutions contain explicit emergency provisions, intended to help governments cope with extraordinary events that endanger many people or the existence of the state. We ask two questions: (1) does the constitutionalization of emergency provisions help governments to cope with disasters and other extraordinary events? (2) What particular parts of emergency constitutions fare best? We find that the more advantages emergency constitutions confer to the executive, the higher the number of people killed as a consequence of a natural disaster, controlling for its severity. As this is an unexpected result, we discuss a number of potential explanations, the most plausible being that governments use natural disasters as a pretext to enhance their power. Furthermore, the easier it is to call a state of emergency, the larger the negative effects on basic human rights. Interestingly, presidential democracies are better able to cope with natural disasters than parliamentary ones in terms of lives saved, whereas autocracies do significantly worse in the sense that empowerment rights seriously suffer in the aftermath of a disaster.",
keywords = "Constitutional emergency provisions, Positive constitutional economics, Regime transformation, State of emergency, {\'E}tat de siege",
author = "Christian Bj{\o}rnskov and Stefan Voigt",
year = "2022",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1007/s11127-021-00918-6",
language = "English",
volume = "190",
pages = "1--32",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Emergencies:

T2 - On the Misuse of Government Powers

AU - Bjørnskov, Christian

AU - Voigt, Stefan

PY - 2022/1

Y1 - 2022/1

N2 - Nine out of 10 constitutions contain explicit emergency provisions, intended to help governments cope with extraordinary events that endanger many people or the existence of the state. We ask two questions: (1) does the constitutionalization of emergency provisions help governments to cope with disasters and other extraordinary events? (2) What particular parts of emergency constitutions fare best? We find that the more advantages emergency constitutions confer to the executive, the higher the number of people killed as a consequence of a natural disaster, controlling for its severity. As this is an unexpected result, we discuss a number of potential explanations, the most plausible being that governments use natural disasters as a pretext to enhance their power. Furthermore, the easier it is to call a state of emergency, the larger the negative effects on basic human rights. Interestingly, presidential democracies are better able to cope with natural disasters than parliamentary ones in terms of lives saved, whereas autocracies do significantly worse in the sense that empowerment rights seriously suffer in the aftermath of a disaster.

AB - Nine out of 10 constitutions contain explicit emergency provisions, intended to help governments cope with extraordinary events that endanger many people or the existence of the state. We ask two questions: (1) does the constitutionalization of emergency provisions help governments to cope with disasters and other extraordinary events? (2) What particular parts of emergency constitutions fare best? We find that the more advantages emergency constitutions confer to the executive, the higher the number of people killed as a consequence of a natural disaster, controlling for its severity. As this is an unexpected result, we discuss a number of potential explanations, the most plausible being that governments use natural disasters as a pretext to enhance their power. Furthermore, the easier it is to call a state of emergency, the larger the negative effects on basic human rights. Interestingly, presidential democracies are better able to cope with natural disasters than parliamentary ones in terms of lives saved, whereas autocracies do significantly worse in the sense that empowerment rights seriously suffer in the aftermath of a disaster.

KW - Constitutional emergency provisions

KW - Positive constitutional economics

KW - Regime transformation

KW - State of emergency

KW - État de siege

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-021-00918-6

DO - 10.1007/s11127-021-00918-6

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 34316085

VL - 190

SP - 1

EP - 32

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 1-2

ER -