Election rules, legislators’ incentives, and policy outcomes: Evidence from the mixed member system in Germany

TY - JOUR

T1 - Election rules, legislators’ incentives, and policy outcomes

T2 - Evidence from the mixed member system in Germany

AU - Maaser, Nicola

AU - Stratmann, Thomas

PY - 2018/9/1

Y1 - 2018/9/1

N2 - Committee membership in mixed-member systems presents an informative setting for studying legislators’ behavior under majoritarian vs. proportional electoral incentives. Committee membership allows for a determination as to whether legislators sort themselves into committees that are more consistent with an objective to win the next election in their electoral district, or more consistent with gaining a more prestigious position in their party. Using data from three large German states, we find that legislators elected in the electoral system's majoritarian tier more often become members of “district committees,” i.e., committees that might give politicians greater opportunity than others to obtain government funds for the benefit of their home districts. This effect is strongest for legislators who won district elections by narrow margins. Moreover, we find that districts that are better represented on “district committees” receive more government funds.

AB - Committee membership in mixed-member systems presents an informative setting for studying legislators’ behavior under majoritarian vs. proportional electoral incentives. Committee membership allows for a determination as to whether legislators sort themselves into committees that are more consistent with an objective to win the next election in their electoral district, or more consistent with gaining a more prestigious position in their party. Using data from three large German states, we find that legislators elected in the electoral system's majoritarian tier more often become members of “district committees,” i.e., committees that might give politicians greater opportunity than others to obtain government funds for the benefit of their home districts. This effect is strongest for legislators who won district elections by narrow margins. Moreover, we find that districts that are better represented on “district committees” receive more government funds.

KW - committees

KW - Comparative political economy

KW - Electoral rules

KW - Mixed-member system

KW - transfers

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044116531&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.03.001

DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.03.001

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85044116531

SN - 0176-2680

VL - 54

SP - 227

EP - 239

JO - European Journal of Political Economy

JF - European Journal of Political Economy

ER -