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Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures

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Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures. / Drud Hansen, Jørgen ; Meinen, Philipp; Nielsen, Jørgen Ulff-Møller.

2012. Paper presented at ETSG 2012, Leuven, Belgium.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearch

Harvard

Drud Hansen, J, Meinen, P & Nielsen, JU-M 2012, 'Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures', Paper presented at ETSG 2012, Leuven, Belgium, 13/09/2012 - 15/09/2012.

APA

Drud Hansen, J., Meinen, P., & Nielsen, J. U-M. (2012). Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures. Paper presented at ETSG 2012, Leuven, Belgium.

CBE

Drud Hansen J, Meinen P, Nielsen JU-M. 2012. Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures. Paper presented at ETSG 2012, Leuven, Belgium.

MLA

Drud Hansen, Jørgen , Philipp Meinen and Jørgen Ulff-Møller Nielsen Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures. ETSG 2012, 13 Sep 2012, Leuven, Belgium, Paper, 2012. 23 p.

Vancouver

Drud Hansen J, Meinen P, Nielsen JU-M. Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures. 2012. Paper presented at ETSG 2012, Leuven, Belgium.

Author

Drud Hansen, Jørgen ; Meinen, Philipp ; Nielsen, Jørgen Ulff-Møller. / Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures. Paper presented at ETSG 2012, Leuven, Belgium.23 p.

Bibtex

@conference{2842d626371c4ba494a85cac183ff2d6,
title = "Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures",
abstract = "Abstract This paper analyzes the role of the elasticity of substitution for anti-dumping decisions across countries. In monopolistic competition models with cost heterogeneous firms across countries, price differences vary inversely with the elasticity of substitution. Anti-dumping duties should therefore also vary inversely with the elasticity of substitution at least for countries which have a strong focus on prices in the determination of their anti-dumping measures. We test this for ten countries from 1990 to 2009 using data on anti-dumping from Chad Bown (2010) and US-data at 8-digit level for elasticity of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006). Applying the ‘lesser duty rule’ in duty determination indicates more attention to prices, and we therefore group the ten countries into those which use ‘the lesser duty rule’, such as the EU, and those which do not, such as the US. The results in our empirical investigation support the predicted role of the elasticity of substitution as we find a significant negative relation between the elasticity of substitution and the final anti-dumping duties for the ‘lesser duty rule’ group of countries. The countries which do not follow the ‘lesser duty rule’ seem to base their duty determination on a broader approach, and the elasticity of substitution is not found significant for the final anti-dumping duties for this group of countries.",
keywords = "Anti-dumping, elasticity of substitution, ‘lesser duty rule’, injury margin, dumping margin, monopolistic competition",
author = "{Drud Hansen}, J{\o}rgen and Philipp Meinen and Nielsen, {J{\o}rgen Ulff-M{\o}ller}",
year = "2012",
month = "9",
day = "13",
language = "English",
note = "ETSG 2012 ; Conference date: 13-09-2012 Through 15-09-2012",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Elasticity of Substitution and Antidumping Measures

AU - Drud Hansen, Jørgen

AU - Meinen, Philipp

AU - Nielsen, Jørgen Ulff-Møller

PY - 2012/9/13

Y1 - 2012/9/13

N2 - Abstract This paper analyzes the role of the elasticity of substitution for anti-dumping decisions across countries. In monopolistic competition models with cost heterogeneous firms across countries, price differences vary inversely with the elasticity of substitution. Anti-dumping duties should therefore also vary inversely with the elasticity of substitution at least for countries which have a strong focus on prices in the determination of their anti-dumping measures. We test this for ten countries from 1990 to 2009 using data on anti-dumping from Chad Bown (2010) and US-data at 8-digit level for elasticity of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006). Applying the ‘lesser duty rule’ in duty determination indicates more attention to prices, and we therefore group the ten countries into those which use ‘the lesser duty rule’, such as the EU, and those which do not, such as the US. The results in our empirical investigation support the predicted role of the elasticity of substitution as we find a significant negative relation between the elasticity of substitution and the final anti-dumping duties for the ‘lesser duty rule’ group of countries. The countries which do not follow the ‘lesser duty rule’ seem to base their duty determination on a broader approach, and the elasticity of substitution is not found significant for the final anti-dumping duties for this group of countries.

AB - Abstract This paper analyzes the role of the elasticity of substitution for anti-dumping decisions across countries. In monopolistic competition models with cost heterogeneous firms across countries, price differences vary inversely with the elasticity of substitution. Anti-dumping duties should therefore also vary inversely with the elasticity of substitution at least for countries which have a strong focus on prices in the determination of their anti-dumping measures. We test this for ten countries from 1990 to 2009 using data on anti-dumping from Chad Bown (2010) and US-data at 8-digit level for elasticity of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006). Applying the ‘lesser duty rule’ in duty determination indicates more attention to prices, and we therefore group the ten countries into those which use ‘the lesser duty rule’, such as the EU, and those which do not, such as the US. The results in our empirical investigation support the predicted role of the elasticity of substitution as we find a significant negative relation between the elasticity of substitution and the final anti-dumping duties for the ‘lesser duty rule’ group of countries. The countries which do not follow the ‘lesser duty rule’ seem to base their duty determination on a broader approach, and the elasticity of substitution is not found significant for the final anti-dumping duties for this group of countries.

KW - Anti-dumping, elasticity of substitution, ‘lesser duty rule’, injury margin, dumping margin, monopolistic competition

M3 - Paper

ER -