Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: A reply to Miller

Joona Räsänen

doi:10.1136/jme-2022-108821

Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: A reply to Miller

Joona Räsänen^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Political Science - CEPDISC

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Comment/debate/letter to the editor › Research › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism - equality between non-disabled human adults - implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human - an attribute which fetuses have - therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of Medical Ethics
Volume	49
Issue	10
Pages (from-to)	717-718
Number of pages	2
ISSN	0306-6800
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2022-108821
Publication status	Published - Oct 2023

Keywords

Abortion - Induced
Ethics- Medical
Fetus
Infanticide
Moral Status

Access to Document

10.1136/jme-2022-108821

Library access?

Check availability with the Royal Danish Library

Cite this

@article{e1209975e4f840fba30aec4920d5b573,

title = "Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: A reply to Miller",

abstract = "Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism - equality between non-disabled human adults - implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human - an attribute which fetuses have - therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.",

keywords = "Abortion - Induced, Ethics- Medical, Fetus, Infanticide, Moral Status",

author = "Joona R{\"a}s{\"a}nen",

year = "2023",

month = oct,

doi = "10.1136/jme-2022-108821",

language = "English",

volume = "49",

pages = "717--718",

journal = "Journal of Medical Ethics",

issn = "0306-6800",

publisher = "BMJ Publishing Group",

number = "10",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion

T2 - A reply to Miller

AU - Räsänen, Joona

PY - 2023/10

Y1 - 2023/10

N2 - Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism - equality between non-disabled human adults - implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human - an attribute which fetuses have - therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.

AB - Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism - equality between non-disabled human adults - implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human - an attribute which fetuses have - therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.

KW - Abortion - Induced

KW - Ethics- Medical

KW - Fetus

KW - Infanticide

KW - Moral Status

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85148673651&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1136/jme-2022-108821

DO - 10.1136/jme-2022-108821

M3 - Comment/debate/letter to the editor

C2 - 36535755

AN - SCOPUS:85148673651

SN - 0306-6800

VL - 49

SP - 717

EP - 718

JO - Journal of Medical Ethics

JF - Journal of Medical Ethics

IS - 10

ER -

Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: A reply to Miller

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Library access?

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this