Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys

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Standard

Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys. / Fleischhacker, Nils; Krupp, Johannes; Malavolta, Giulio; Schneider, Jonas; Schröder, Dominique; Simkin, Mark.

In: IET Information Security, Vol. 12, No. 3, 01.05.2018, p. 166-183.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Fleischhacker, N, Krupp, J, Malavolta, G, Schneider, J, Schröder, D & Simkin, M 2018, 'Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys', IET Information Security, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 166-183. https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0041

APA

Fleischhacker, N., Krupp, J., Malavolta, G., Schneider, J., Schröder, D., & Simkin, M. (2018). Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys. IET Information Security, 12(3), 166-183. https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0041

CBE

Fleischhacker N, Krupp J, Malavolta G, Schneider J, Schröder D, Simkin M. 2018. Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys. IET Information Security. 12(3):166-183. https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0041

MLA

Vancouver

Fleischhacker N, Krupp J, Malavolta G, Schneider J, Schröder D, Simkin M. Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys. IET Information Security. 2018 May 1;12(3):166-183. https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0041

Author

Fleischhacker, Nils ; Krupp, Johannes ; Malavolta, Giulio ; Schneider, Jonas ; Schröder, Dominique ; Simkin, Mark. / Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys. In: IET Information Security. 2018 ; Vol. 12, No. 3. pp. 166-183.

Bibtex

@article{b5db7dfb611745fc94343f0d2fd259a7,
title = "Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys",
abstract = "A sanitizable signature scheme is a malleable signature scheme where a designated third party has the permission to modify certain parts of the message and adapt the signature accordingly. This primitive was introduced by Ateniese et al. (ESORICS 2005) and Brzuska et al. (PKC 2009) formalized the initially suggested five security properties. In the subsequent year, Brzuska et al. (PKC 2010) introduced a notion called unlinkability where the basic idea is that linking message-signature pairs of the same document should be infeasible. Brzuska et al. formalized this notion and suggested a generic instantiation based on group signatures with a special structure. Unfortunately, the most efficient instantiations of group signatures do not have this property. In this work, we present the first efficient construction of unlinkable sanitizable signatures based on a novel type of signature schemes with re-randomizable keys. This property allows one to re-randomize both the signing and the verification key separately but consistently. Given a signature scheme with re-randomizable keys, we obtain a sanitizable signature scheme by signing the message with a re-randomized key and proving in zero-knowledge that the derived key originates from either the signer or the sanitizer. To obtain an efficient instantiation, we instantiate this generic idea with Schnorr signatures and efficient σ-protocols that we turn into a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof via the Fiat-Shamir transformation. In this work, we present an optimized version that is more efficient than the construction we suggested in the extended abstract of this work at PKC 2016.",
author = "Nils Fleischhacker and Johannes Krupp and Giulio Malavolta and Jonas Schneider and Dominique Schr{\"o}der and Mark Simkin",
year = "2018",
month = may,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0041",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "166--183",
journal = "IET Information Security",
issn = "1751-8709",
publisher = "Institution of Engineering and Technology",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Efficient unlinkable sanitizable signatures from signatures with re-randomizable keys

AU - Fleischhacker, Nils

AU - Krupp, Johannes

AU - Malavolta, Giulio

AU - Schneider, Jonas

AU - Schröder, Dominique

AU - Simkin, Mark

PY - 2018/5/1

Y1 - 2018/5/1

N2 - A sanitizable signature scheme is a malleable signature scheme where a designated third party has the permission to modify certain parts of the message and adapt the signature accordingly. This primitive was introduced by Ateniese et al. (ESORICS 2005) and Brzuska et al. (PKC 2009) formalized the initially suggested five security properties. In the subsequent year, Brzuska et al. (PKC 2010) introduced a notion called unlinkability where the basic idea is that linking message-signature pairs of the same document should be infeasible. Brzuska et al. formalized this notion and suggested a generic instantiation based on group signatures with a special structure. Unfortunately, the most efficient instantiations of group signatures do not have this property. In this work, we present the first efficient construction of unlinkable sanitizable signatures based on a novel type of signature schemes with re-randomizable keys. This property allows one to re-randomize both the signing and the verification key separately but consistently. Given a signature scheme with re-randomizable keys, we obtain a sanitizable signature scheme by signing the message with a re-randomized key and proving in zero-knowledge that the derived key originates from either the signer or the sanitizer. To obtain an efficient instantiation, we instantiate this generic idea with Schnorr signatures and efficient σ-protocols that we turn into a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof via the Fiat-Shamir transformation. In this work, we present an optimized version that is more efficient than the construction we suggested in the extended abstract of this work at PKC 2016.

AB - A sanitizable signature scheme is a malleable signature scheme where a designated third party has the permission to modify certain parts of the message and adapt the signature accordingly. This primitive was introduced by Ateniese et al. (ESORICS 2005) and Brzuska et al. (PKC 2009) formalized the initially suggested five security properties. In the subsequent year, Brzuska et al. (PKC 2010) introduced a notion called unlinkability where the basic idea is that linking message-signature pairs of the same document should be infeasible. Brzuska et al. formalized this notion and suggested a generic instantiation based on group signatures with a special structure. Unfortunately, the most efficient instantiations of group signatures do not have this property. In this work, we present the first efficient construction of unlinkable sanitizable signatures based on a novel type of signature schemes with re-randomizable keys. This property allows one to re-randomize both the signing and the verification key separately but consistently. Given a signature scheme with re-randomizable keys, we obtain a sanitizable signature scheme by signing the message with a re-randomized key and proving in zero-knowledge that the derived key originates from either the signer or the sanitizer. To obtain an efficient instantiation, we instantiate this generic idea with Schnorr signatures and efficient σ-protocols that we turn into a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof via the Fiat-Shamir transformation. In this work, we present an optimized version that is more efficient than the construction we suggested in the extended abstract of this work at PKC 2016.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85045055144&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0041

DO - 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0041

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85045055144

VL - 12

SP - 166

EP - 183

JO - IET Information Security

JF - IET Information Security

SN - 1751-8709

IS - 3

ER -