Distributional consequences of political representation

Nicola Maaser*, Thomas Stratmann

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the effect of the geographic concentration of representatives on the geographic distribution of fiscal transfers. Our theoretical model predicts that more representatives residing in a geographic area leads to higher government funds to that area. Our empirical analysis uses the fact that in Germany, due to Germany[U+05F3]s electoral rules in state elections, the number of representatives varies across electoral districts. Controlling for various socio-economic, demographic, and political variables and using a variety of estimation methods, we find that districts with a greater number of representatives receive more government funds.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume82
Pages (from-to)187-211
Number of pages25
ISSN0014-2921
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Comparative political economy
  • Redistribution
  • Representation
  • Transfers
  • Vote-buying

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Distributional consequences of political representation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this