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Final published version
Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a “one-person, one-vote” scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as moral, epistemic, social, and empirical equals in a scheme with differential voting weights. I end the article by showing that from the perspective of relational egalitarianism, it is sometimes true that differential voting weights are more just than equal voting weights.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Political Studies |
Volume | 68 |
Issue | 4 |
Pages (from-to) | 1054-1070 |
Number of pages | 17 |
ISSN | 0032-3217 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2020 |
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