Differential Voting Weights and Relational Egalitarianism

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Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a “one-person, one-vote” scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as moral, epistemic, social, and empirical equals in a scheme with differential voting weights. I end the article by showing that from the perspective of relational egalitarianism, it is sometimes true that differential voting weights are more just than equal voting weights.

Original languageEnglish
JournalPolitical Studies
Pages (from-to)1054-1070
Number of pages17
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2020


  • Elizabeth Anderson
  • democracy
  • relational egalitarianism
  • voting weights


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