Aarhus University Seal

Cryptographic reverse firewalls for interactive proof systems

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

  • Chaya Ganesh, Indian Institute of Science Bangalore
  • ,
  • Bernardo Magri
  • ,
  • Daniele Venturi, University of Rome La Sapienza

We study interactive proof systems (IPSes) in a strong adversarial setting where the machines of honest parties might be corrupted and under control of the adversary. Our aim is to answer the following, seemingly paradoxical, questions: Can Peggy convince Vic of the veracity of an NP statement, without leaking any information about the witness even in case Vic is malicious and Peggy does not trust her computer? Can we avoid that Peggy fools Vic into accepting false statements, even if Peggy is malicious and Vic does not trust her computer? At EUROCRYPT 2015, Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz introduced cryptographic reverse firewalls (RFs) as an attractive approach to tackling such questions. Intuitively, a RF for Peggy/Vic is an external party that sits between Peggy/Vic and the outside world and whose scope is to sanitize Peggy's/Vic's incoming and outgoing messages in the face of subversion of her/his computer, e.g. in order to destroy subliminal channels. In this paper, we put forward several natural security properties for RFs in the concrete setting of IPSes. As our main contribution, we construct efficient RFs for different IPSes derived from a large class of Sigma protocols that we call malleable. A nice feature of our design is that it is completely transparent, in the sense that our RFs can be directly applied to already deployed IPSes, without the need to re-implement them.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2020
EditorsArtur Czumaj, Anuj Dawar, Emanuela Merelli
PublisherSchloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
Publication yearJun 2020
Pages55:1-55:16
ISBN (electronic)9783959771382
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2020
Event47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2020 - Virtual, Online, Germany
Duration: 8 Jul 202011 Jul 2020

Conference

Conference47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2020
LandGermany
ByVirtual, Online
Periode08/07/202011/07/2020
SponsorCenter for Perspicuous Computing (CPEC), Saarland University in Saarbrucken
SeriesLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
Volume168
ISSN1868-8969

    Research areas

  • Algorithm substitution attacks, Cryptographic reverse firewalls, Interactive proofs, Subversion, Zero knowledge

See relations at Aarhus University Citationformats

ID: 194977248