Costly voting in weighted committees: The case of moral costs

Nicola Maaser; Thomas Stratmann

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652

Costly voting in weighted committees: The case of moral costs

Nicola Maaser^*, Thomas Stratmann

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics and Business Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

We develop a theoretical model of voting behavior in committees when members differ in influence and receive payoffs that condition on the individual vote and the collective decision. Applied to a group decision involving moral costs, the model predicts that the distribution of decision-making power affects committee members’ incentives to make immoral choices: More influential agents tend to support the immoral choice, while less influential agents free-ride. A skewed power distribution makes immoral collective choices more likely. We then present results of a laboratory experiment that studies committee members’ voting behavior and collective choices under different distributions of decision-making power. As hypothesized, we find that the frequency of immoral decisions is positively related to an agent's voting power.

Original language	English
Article number	104652
Journal	European Economic Review
Volume	162
ISSN	0014-2921
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652
Publication status	Published - Feb 2024

Keywords

Committees
Decision rules
Economic experiments
Moral behavior
Threshold public good games

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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652

https://authors.elsevier.com/sd/article/S0014-2921(23)00280-5Licence: CC BY

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title = "Costly voting in weighted committees: The case of moral costs",

abstract = "We develop a theoretical model of voting behavior in committees when members differ in influence and receive payoffs that condition on the individual vote and the collective decision. Applied to a group decision involving moral costs, the model predicts that the distribution of decision-making power affects committee members{\textquoteright} incentives to make immoral choices: More influential agents tend to support the immoral choice, while less influential agents free-ride. A skewed power distribution makes immoral collective choices more likely. We then present results of a laboratory experiment that studies committee members{\textquoteright} voting behavior and collective choices under different distributions of decision-making power. As hypothesized, we find that the frequency of immoral decisions is positively related to an agent's voting power.",

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AU - Maaser, Nicola

AU - Stratmann, Thomas

PY - 2024/2

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N2 - We develop a theoretical model of voting behavior in committees when members differ in influence and receive payoffs that condition on the individual vote and the collective decision. Applied to a group decision involving moral costs, the model predicts that the distribution of decision-making power affects committee members’ incentives to make immoral choices: More influential agents tend to support the immoral choice, while less influential agents free-ride. A skewed power distribution makes immoral collective choices more likely. We then present results of a laboratory experiment that studies committee members’ voting behavior and collective choices under different distributions of decision-making power. As hypothesized, we find that the frequency of immoral decisions is positively related to an agent's voting power.

AB - We develop a theoretical model of voting behavior in committees when members differ in influence and receive payoffs that condition on the individual vote and the collective decision. Applied to a group decision involving moral costs, the model predicts that the distribution of decision-making power affects committee members’ incentives to make immoral choices: More influential agents tend to support the immoral choice, while less influential agents free-ride. A skewed power distribution makes immoral collective choices more likely. We then present results of a laboratory experiment that studies committee members’ voting behavior and collective choices under different distributions of decision-making power. As hypothesized, we find that the frequency of immoral decisions is positively related to an agent's voting power.

KW - Committees

KW - Decision rules

KW - Economic experiments

KW - Moral behavior

KW - Threshold public good games

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104652

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85181159325

SN - 0014-2921

VL - 162

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

M1 - 104652

ER -

Costly voting in weighted committees: The case of moral costs

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Keywords

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