Department of Economics and Business Economics

Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions

Research output: Working paper/Preprint Working paperResearch

Standard

Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions. / Krügel, Jan Philipp; Maaser, Nicola Friederike.

Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2020.

Research output: Working paper/Preprint Working paperResearch

Harvard

Krügel, JP & Maaser, NF 2020 'Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions' Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

APA

Krügel, J. P., & Maaser, N. F. (2020). Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions. Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. Economics Working Papers No. 2020-15

CBE

Krügel JP, Maaser NF. 2020. Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet.

MLA

Krügel, Jan Philipp and Nicola Friederike Maaser Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. (Economics Working Papers; Journal number 2020-15). 2020., 32 p.

Vancouver

Krügel JP, Maaser NF. Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. 2020 Oct.

Author

Krügel, Jan Philipp ; Maaser, Nicola Friederike. / Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions. Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2020. (Economics Working Papers; No. 2020-15).

Bibtex

@techreport{30d7ce50a60843c4a11c9aafd9abf424,
title = "Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions",
abstract = "The willingness of mere bystanders, or “third parties,” to incur costs to sanction non-cooperators in social dilemma situations has been documented in numerous studies. It is, however, not clear yet how different forms of higher-order punishment affect third party behavior and the level of cooperation. This paper experimentally studies incentives for third parties to enforce contribution norms in public-good games. We compare two treatments where the third party is embedded in different stylized institutions to a baseline treatment where this is not the case. In our treatments, the third party is, first, evaluated by another uninvolved individual ({"}fourth party{"}), and second, faces competition by another potential third party punisher. We find that third parties punish free-riding public good players more severely if they have to fear negative payoff consequences for themselves. Importantly, our results point to substantial qualitative differences between the institutional arrangements: When the third party is under scrutiny of a fourth party, punishment is more balanced, but also high compared to the other treatments. By contrast, competition between two third party candidates leads to strategic and partial punishment, generating the most profitable outcomes for public good players.",
keywords = "Third party punishment, Higher-order punishment, Cooperation, Public goods game, Experiments",
author = "Kr{\"u}gel, {Jan Philipp} and Maaser, {Nicola Friederike}",
year = "2020",
month = oct,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers",
publisher = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",
number = "2020-15",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions

AU - Krügel, Jan Philipp

AU - Maaser, Nicola Friederike

PY - 2020/10

Y1 - 2020/10

N2 - The willingness of mere bystanders, or “third parties,” to incur costs to sanction non-cooperators in social dilemma situations has been documented in numerous studies. It is, however, not clear yet how different forms of higher-order punishment affect third party behavior and the level of cooperation. This paper experimentally studies incentives for third parties to enforce contribution norms in public-good games. We compare two treatments where the third party is embedded in different stylized institutions to a baseline treatment where this is not the case. In our treatments, the third party is, first, evaluated by another uninvolved individual ("fourth party"), and second, faces competition by another potential third party punisher. We find that third parties punish free-riding public good players more severely if they have to fear negative payoff consequences for themselves. Importantly, our results point to substantial qualitative differences between the institutional arrangements: When the third party is under scrutiny of a fourth party, punishment is more balanced, but also high compared to the other treatments. By contrast, competition between two third party candidates leads to strategic and partial punishment, generating the most profitable outcomes for public good players.

AB - The willingness of mere bystanders, or “third parties,” to incur costs to sanction non-cooperators in social dilemma situations has been documented in numerous studies. It is, however, not clear yet how different forms of higher-order punishment affect third party behavior and the level of cooperation. This paper experimentally studies incentives for third parties to enforce contribution norms in public-good games. We compare two treatments where the third party is embedded in different stylized institutions to a baseline treatment where this is not the case. In our treatments, the third party is, first, evaluated by another uninvolved individual ("fourth party"), and second, faces competition by another potential third party punisher. We find that third parties punish free-riding public good players more severely if they have to fear negative payoff consequences for themselves. Importantly, our results point to substantial qualitative differences between the institutional arrangements: When the third party is under scrutiny of a fourth party, punishment is more balanced, but also high compared to the other treatments. By contrast, competition between two third party candidates leads to strategic and partial punishment, generating the most profitable outcomes for public good players.

KW - Third party punishment

KW - Higher-order punishment

KW - Cooperation

KW - Public goods game

KW - Experiments

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers

BT - Cooperation and Norm-Enforcement under Impartial vs. Competitive Sanctions

PB - Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet

CY - Aarhus

ER -