Department of Economics and Business Economics

Constitutional Verbosity and Social Trust

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

A common argument in the trust literature is that high-trust cultures allow efficient commercial contracts to be shorter, covering fewer contingencies. We take this idea to the topic of social contracts. Specifically, we ask whether social trust affects the length and detail of constitutions. Cross-country estimates suggest that national trust levels are indeed robustly and negatively associated with the length of countries’ constitutions.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPublic Choice
Pages (from-to)91-112
Number of pages22
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Bibliographical note

Campus adgang til artiklen / Campus access to the article

    Research areas

  • Constitutional policy economy, Social trust

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